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When abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes pri-
vately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling 
devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger 
positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions 
is the one with the highest expectation about the other countries’ reactions, and 
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The lack of supranational authority implies that international policy measures 
must rely solely on voluntarily contributions. Barrett (1990 and 1994) seriously 
questions the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, as ex-
emplified by the troublesome process of regime building for the climate change 
issue. The reason is that the creation of the right set of incentives for voluntary 
reductions of emissions in excess of purely non-coordinated reduction levels is 
not easy. Therefore, a very concerned country might initiate unilateral actions if 
such actions act as ‘setting a good example’. Unilateral actions appear in many 
areas of the international society such as unilateral reductions in armaments, 
unilateral aid to developing countries, unilateral reductions in trade sanctions or 
increases of trade concessions, and in the field of transboundary pollution prob-
lems, unilateral cut backs in emissions. Unilateral actions to alleviate IEP have 
been analysed in e.g. Hoel (1991) and Barrett (1990). A rather pessimistic result 
emerges in both and can be summarized by saying that leadership of this kind is 
seldom rewarded. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to re-examine the prospect of unilateral ac-
tions providing a non-cooperative alternative to the cooperative actions of mul-
tinational negotiations. Although it cannot be expected that such actions will, at 
any point, bring about a fully cooperative solution, they nevertheless might 
make a difference in overcoming the first, and potentially most troublesome 
phase, in the process of building up an effective reduction regime when incen-
tives do not support cooperation.  
 
In the model of Hoel (1991), two countries play a non co-operative game each 
maximizing the net-benefit from reducing environmentally harmful emissions. 
One country, however, also cares about the emission reductions in the other 
country. This is modelled by introducing a function containing non-economic 
variables. Such unilateral actions might be justified as being a contribution in 
the right direction, and also, by setting a good example of this type, one might 
affect the behaviour of other countries, and/or improve the chances of reaching 
 
7international agreements for co-ordinated reductions of harmful emissions. The 
main findings in Hoel’s paper are that unilateral actions will at its best reduce 
the overall emission level (but by less than the unilateral reduction itself), but at 
worse, they might actually increase total emissions. Hoel (1991, p.69) con-
cludes that: “it might not be particularly sensible for an environmental group in 
a country to try to force its government to unilaterally reduce the countries 
emissions”.  
 
Hoel (1991) mentions ‘setting a good example’ as being the reason for unilat-
eral actions, without explicitly modelling how such a good example could be 
accomplished. In this paper unilateral actions are re-formulated, not as setting a 
good example, but rather as transmitting relevant information. In order for uni-
lateral actions to work they must somehow transmit information that directly 
alters the position of the reaction functions of the other countries in a preferred 
direction from the initiators’ point of view.
1 
 
This is accomplished by invoking three assumptions. First, the costs are fully 
correlated between countries. The second is that a country can be fully (but pri-
vately) informed about the relevant cost parameter, and this incurs a fixed cost. 
Finally, it is assumed that no verification technologies exist, which implies that 
transmission of information is only possible by making a reduction effort. 
Given these assumptions, unilateral actions are indeed profitable. The prospect 
or likelihood of unilateral actions depends on the finer details of the informa-
tion-structure, and if the above assumptions are satisfied, unilateral actions are 
shown to always be profitable. Two common-sense results are derived: the first 
is that the higher the correlation, the more likely that unilateral actions are prof-
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1   Our signalling approach resembles the idea of 'leading by example', analysed in Hermalin 
(1998). Here the leader is defined on the basis of being better informed, and has to undertake 
some costly effort to convince the others that effort is worthwhile undertaking. The difference 
between the two approaches is that in our model, the countries are initially uninformed, but can 
choose to become informed, which is costly. Hence, the choice of getting informed is deter-
mined endogenously in the model and in this respect resembles the approach of Kessler (1998). 
She discusses the idea of undertaking a costly information gathering activity in order to become 
(privately) informed. itable, and second, if a country can only get imperfect information, then unilat-
eral actions are less likely.  
 
To gain further insight into the cause and prospect of unilateral action not found 
in Hoel (1991), two additional changes are made. First, the countries differ with 
respect to the expected response of the other countries if valuable information is 
revealed to these countries. The second change is to introduce a simple model 
where the decision about the level of environmental regulation in a country is 
determined by the lobbying activities of two pressure groups in that country: An 
industrial group lobbying for no reductions and an environmental group lobby-
ing for a high level of reduction. The more pressure a group exerts, the more it 
influences the policy outcome. The observation that the political process in a 
country is polymorphic is also analysed in e.g. Dijkstra (1999), on basis of an 
influential function.  
 
Unilateral actions are most likely when costs are positively correlated, when a 
country can be fully informed at low costs and a country can receive a perfect 
signal. Unilateral actions are most likely when countries initially are reluctantly 
to engage in any significant reduction effort, which could be caused by pressure 
from lobby groups. Moreover, the model yields a broader framework for under-
standing the reasons why a country moves first, the initial positions of the coun-
tries and how transmission of information interferes with policy choices in 
other countries. Finally, an interesting result emerges regarding which country 
initiates unilateral actions: The curse of the country that initiates the unilateral 
action is that, since it is the country with the highest estimate of the response of 
the other countries in case reduction costs are revealed as low, this country is 
likely to over-estimate the actual response of the other countries. This might 
explain why unilateral actions are initiated, but as Barrett (1990) claims, initia-
tives of this kind are seldom rewarded. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the basic model is presented, 
and in section 3, private information about costs is introduced. Section 4 shows 
how Hoel’s (1991) results also carries over to the situation with private infor-
 
9mation about costs. The insight gained in the first part of the paper is used in 
section 5 to model a situation, where unilateral actions are possible, which is 
formally shown in section 6. In section 7, we relax the assumptions and this 
shows the robustness of our results. Finally, an alternative specification of the 
way environmental policy is determined is given in section 8, while section 9 
concludes the paper.  
2. Model 
First, a model of an international environmental problem that resembles the 
original specification of Hoel (1991) will be presented. This will enable us to 
use Hoel’s model as a benchmark and his results as a point of departure for fur-
ther analysis. The set of countries is  } ,..., 2 , 1 { N I = . Each country emits ei, the 
polluting substance, which cause environmental degradation both domestically 
and abroad. For simplicity, assume auniformly mixed pollutant giving rise to a 
global emission problem. Hence, each country is affected by the total emission 
level  . Let the emission level in the case of no environmental concern 
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2   Although the possibility of emissions above   cannot simply be excluded, we dismiss this 
possibility here. See Brandt (2002) for a model where, for strategic reasons, emissions are 







 measures the benefits to country i from total reduction, q. On the other 
hand, costs of controlling emissions only depend on own reductions, qi, and are 
measured by  . We make the standard assumptions on the functions that 
 and   while   and  .
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3 Hence, the net-benefit 
to country i from own and total reduction efforts amounts to:  
 
   (1)  2 1 i    , ) ( ) ( , q C q B NB i i i i = − =
 
Given the assumptions, the net benefit functions are strictly concave in qi. If 
each country behaves non co-operatively, it maximises its own net-benefit func-
tion with respect to its own reductions, qi, considering only damage in its own 
country but not the damage it causes in other countries, or alternatively, not 
considering the public good character of own reduction. The first order condi-
tion for a country to maximize its net benefit in a non-cooperative setting is ob-
tained by differentiating (1) with respect to own reductions, taking the other 
countries’ reductions, q-i as given: 
 
0 ) ( ) (
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Define the best reply function, or the reaction function of country i, as the func-
tion that relates the optimal choice of country i to the choice of reduction of the 
other countries,  ) ( i i i q q q − = . The slope of this function is determined as 
' ' ' '
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Moreover, given the assumptions on the benefit and cost functions, there exists 
a unique (and interior) Nash-equilibrium given by   at the  , { 1
nc nc q q =
                                                           




  Conditions that guarantee a unique (and interior) Nash equilibrium are given in Finus (2001, 
chapter 9). intersection of the reaction curves.
5 Assume that in the case of no coordination, 
these levels will result.
6 
 
The immediate question arises of how to define a unilateral action, since unilat-
eral movement away from a Nash-equilibrium is not a self-enforcing move? In 
Hoel (1991), this is accomplished by assuming that one country acts as if it is 
not maximizing (1), but instead  ∑ ⋅ + − = i i i i q h q C q B NB ) ( ) ( , where h>0 in-
dicates that the country also benefits from reduction in ways not covered by the 
cost and benefit relations defined in (1).
7 Hoel (1991) stresses that h are not a 
choice variable.  
 
Figure 1.  The effect of a unilateral increase in reductions by country 1 
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Given the definition given above, what happens in Hoel’s case is easily deter-









, any unilateral 
increase in reductions by one country will be responded to by a decrease in re-
ductions by all other countries. This is illustrated in a two-country version, in 
                                                           
5   We occasionally use vector notation  , which, due to the assumption of a uniformly 
mixed pollutant, is equal to  . 
) , (
nc
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6   This is a common observation; see e.g. Hoel (1997). 
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7   See Hoel (1991) for a precise definition of h. In this way Hoel defines that any reduction above 
the Nash equilibrium is a unilateral action, and at the same time it is in a sense a new stable 
situation since there will be no further adjustments. figure 1. Although total reductions might be increased by a unilateral move, it 
does not seem to be a good idea for country i to engage in unilateral actions, if 
its aim of setting a good example will be strategically exploited by other coun-
tries. No rational country will ever find it worthwhile to undertake unilateral 
actions under this model. 
 
One shortcoming with Hoel’s approach is that h remains unexplained. It does 
not seem to be rational for a country to engage in unilateral actions when it 
knows the above relationship. This is why h cannot be a choice variable in 
Hoel’s model. The interesting question remains: Can unilateral actions be ra-
tional (i.e. result from optimising behaviour) if Hoel’s (1991) reaction function 
approach is used without conditioning unilateral actions on the presence of non-
choice variables?  
 
We turn now to an examination of the way the costs influence the Nash-
equilibrium. Let θi be a shifting parameter in the cost function of country i, such 
that:  
 
   for   for all  ) , ( ) , (
2 1
i i i i i i q C q C θ θ >
2 1
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The intuition behind (3) is that increased costs in country 1 lead to less reduc-
tions by country 1, which increases the marginal benefit to country 2 (as long as 
country 2 does not change its emission). Hence, country 2 will respond by in-
creasing its reduction efforts. 
 
133. Cost  uncertainty 
Next, private information about reduction costs is introduced. The main purpose 
of this section is to show how to determine an expected (or Bayesian) Nash 
equilibrium and how revelation of information can result in changes in reduc-
tions by the other countries. This model serves as a (benchmark) framework for 
the following, focusing exclusively on the effect stemming from information 
transmission. 
 
Assume two possible cost types, low cost countries, denoted L and high cost 
countries, denoted H, i.e.,  } , { H L i ∈ θ . Let  ) ( L prob j j = = θ ρ  be the (common) 
prior probability that the cost parameter of country j is low, with 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 n θ θ θ θ = . Let  ) ,..., , ( 2 1 n ρ ρ ρ ρ =  be the vector of common prior beliefs 
about the types of the n countries.  
 
The reaction function of country i, in the most general form, is given by 
) ), ( , ( ρ ρ θ i i i i q q q − = , which says that the best reply function by country i is de-
pendent on own type,  i θ , expected choice of reductions of the other countries, 
) (ρ i q− , and the common prior belief vector, ρ . In a two country version, 
) ), ( , ( 2 1 1 1 θ θ θ q q q =
1 q
 denotes the reaction function for country 1 under full in-
formation, while   is the situation with complete uncertainty. 
The non-cooperative (Nash) equilibrium is given by   under com-
plete uncertainty, and   under full information and two countries. 
Most importantly, it follows from (3),





















ρ  (4) 
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, which says that the higher another countries’ costs, the 
higher the own reduction. Since ρ is the probability for low costs, the more likely that the other 
country has low costs, the lower will be the own reduction. This derivative forms the basic incentives in the first part of this paper.  
 
To illustrate how revelation of information influences the choices in the non-
cooperative equilibrium, assume the following one-period structure: the cost to 
country 2, θi, is common knowledge, while the cost of country 1 is private in-
formation to this country, whereas country 2 hold a prior belief of ρ1 that its 
cost is low.
9 This case is illustrated in figure 2. The relevant reaction function 
for country 1 is  ) ), ( , ( 2 1 2 1 1 1 θ ρ θ q q q = . Since it knows both countries’ costs, its 
reaction function does not change when beliefs change. The reaction function 
for country 2 is:  ) , , ( 1 1 2 2 2 ρ θ q q q = . Here, the position of the reaction functions 
shift with changes in ρ1, i.e., if costs are revealed as high, then the reaction 
function shifts upwards, as illustrated in figure 2. Now, how can country 1 in-
crease the reductions of country 2? If it is revealed that the costs of country 1 
are high, then due to (3), country 2 increases its reductions from   to 
, while at the same time the reduction of country 1 decreases from 
 to  . In figure 2, the indifference curve going through 
point A shows that this is a preferred point for country 1. If country 1 can report 
verifiable information about θ
) , ( 2 1 2 θ ρ
nc q
) , ( 2 2 θ H q
nc
) , ( 2 1 1 θ ρ
nc q ) , ( 2 1 θ H
nc q
i costlessly, (or at sufficiently low cost) to country 
2, or when the costs of being informed are small, then it is optimal for country i 
to reveal its costs. 
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9   See Tirole (1988, ch. 8) for a detailed examination on this issue. Figure 2.  Changes in the equilibrium when costs are revealed 
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      ) , ( 2 1 1 θ ρ
nc q    
) , ( 2 1 2 θ ρ
nc q  
) ), ( , ( 2 1 2 1 1 θ ρ θ q q
) , , ( 1 1 2
2 ρ θ q qe  
) , , ( 1 2 2 H q q θ  
) , , ( 1 2 2 L q q θ
2 q  
 
 
Note, however, that if it costs turn out to be low, then county 1 has an incentive 
to hide this knowledge. We will come back to these incentives in section 5. But 
this is not, however, the end of the story. The low cost country has the same in-
centives as the high cost country to try to persuade the uninformed country that 
costs are high. In order for the high cost type to be perceived as having truly 
high costs, it must engage in an action that perfectly distinguishes it from the 
shadow of the low cost country. The appropriate way to analyse this is by use of 
a signalling game model. 
4.  Signalling game 1: Incentives to signal that costs are 
high 
In the signalling game 1, we focus on the revelation of one country’s costs. The 
other countries could have private information about their costs, be uncertain 
about their costs or be fully informed. Country i has private information about 
costs, while the others hold a prior belief about its costs. We assume that al-
though it is common knowledge that this country is completely informed about 
costs, there exists no verification technology. The reason for this is that no mat-
 
16ter what the true state of costs is, the informed country always has a strong in-
centive to announce that costs are high. The only way a country can convince 
the relevant parties that it has high costs, is by engaging in a unilateral deviation 
from the non-cooperative optimum by such an amount that only a country with 
high costs will find it worthwhile undertaking. 
 
Now an abstract signalling game model is setup. In period 1, the informed 
country can choose to signal its costs by deviating from non-cooperative reduc-
tion path. The other countries choose their output on the basis of their best reply 
function (which is based on their prior cost estimates). Next they evaluate the 
chosen outcomes, and update their beliefs by use of Bayes rule. On the basis of 
these new beliefs, they play their best reply in the second period.  
 
The following notation will be used: 
 
Choice in period 1: 
1
i q  
1
i q−  
Updating of beliefs:  ) (
1 q i ρ   ) (
1 q i − ρ  
Choice in period 2:  )) ( (
1 2 q q i i ρ   )) ( (
1 2 q q i i − − ρ  
 
Superscripts denote periods and   is the total vector of outputs in pe-
riod 1. Note that second period choices are fully determined by first-period ac-
tions and prior beliefs. Initially, nature draws a type θ from the set {L, H}, ac-
cording to a probability distribution (ρ, 1-ρ) where ρ=prob  (θ=L). 
 is the two-
period net benefit for country i from playing q
) , (
1 1
i i q q q − =
( q ( NB i
2










i i i i θ ρ θ ρ ρ θ − − − =
i, and the optimal response from 
country j, given country i’s type in both periods.
10 Moreover, let q(L,1) and 
q(H,0) be the full information maximizer of NBi for the low costs and the high 
cost types, respectively. Note that q(H,0) < q(L,1), see figure 3 for an example. 
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10   Assume no discounting. In general including discounting makes unilateral actions less likely, 
since it reduces the second period gains from a unilateral action. Sequential equilibrium 
We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria. Consequently, there remains 
two different kinds of equilibria; separating equilibria, where each type send 
different signals, and pooling equilibria where the two types send the same sig-
nal. Since the analysis focuses on the prospects of unilateral actions, focus is 
exclusively on sequential separating equilibrium, or more precisely, interest is 
on finding condition for a separating equilibrium to exist. In a separating equi-
librium, the receiver can perfectly infer the type of the sender. Formally, a col-
lection of reduction levels and beliefs  } ) q ( ˆ , q ˆ , q ˆ { L H ρ  forms a sequential equi-
librium if the following conditions are satisfied:  
 
i) Optimality for the country with costs θ: 
 
)) q ( ˆ , q , ( NB max arg q ˆ i i i ρ θ θ ∈  
 
ii) Beliefs are Bayes-consistent: 
 
a)    1 ) q ˆ ( ˆ   and   0 ) q ˆ ( ˆ   then   q ˆ q ˆ   If L H L H = = ≠ ρ ρ
b)   
o
L H L H ) q ˆ ( ˆ ) q ˆ ( ˆ   then   q ˆ q ˆ   If ρ ρ ρ = = =
c)  admissible   is   ) ( ˆ any      } ˆ , ˆ { q   θ θ ρ q then q q If L H ≠  
 
After observing qi, the receiver must form a belief about which types could 
have sent qi. These posterior beliefs are denoted ρ(θqi) with 
ρ(Lqi)+ρ(Hqi)=1. The first requirement of strategies that form a sequential 
equilibrium is sequential rationality, which amounts to saying that for each qi, qj 
must maximise expected payoffs, given the beliefs. Regarding the optimality of 
beliefs, if   and the receiver observes, e.g.,  , then it must be that costs 
are high, and the only consistent belief is 
L H q ˆ q ˆ ≠ H q ˆ
0 ) q ˆ ( ˆ H = ρ  and given this belief, it is 
optimal for the high cost type to play  . In this particular signalling game the 
requirement of consistency of beliefs does not place any restrictions on beliefs 
H q ˆ
 
18following out-of-equilibrium signals, i.e., any beliefs are admissible if an out-
of-equilibrium outcome is observed. 
Separating equilibrium 
In a separating equilibrium, the high cost type succeeds in separating from the 
low cost type, and is, therefore, always recognized as a high cost type, while the 
low cost type is revealed as a low cost type. In order to fully describe the set of 
possible separating equilibrium outcomes, it is assumed that out-of equilibrium 
signals are followed by the most unfavorable beliefs seen from the informed 
country’s point of view, i.e., if  1 ) ( ˆ     ˆ q = ≠ θ θ ρ q then qH . 
 
Given these beliefs, a sufficient condition for a strategy pair to form a separat-
ing equilibrium is that the following conditions for a separating equilibrium be 
satisfied: 
 
) 1 ), 0 , H ( q , H ( NB ) 0 , q ˆ , H ( NB i
H
i i ≥  (4.a) 
) 1 ), 1 , L ( q , L ( NB ) 0 , q ˆ , L ( NB i
H
i i ≤  (4.b) 
 
In order to describe the set of separating equilibrium outcomes, it will be useful 
to define the following two sets: 






i ≥ ∈ =







} R R q | q { R
H L
i i
SL ∩ ∈ =
i 
that satisfies (4.a) and  , which is 
the set of q
)} 1 ), 1 , L ( q , L ( NB ) i ≤
i that satisfies (4.b). The intersection of these two sets is given by 
. 
 
The set of separating equilibrium outcomes is given by: 
 
SL H
i R q ˆ ∈  (5.a) 
) 1 , L ( q q ˆ i
L
i =  (5.b) 
 
 
19Result 1:  A separating equilibrium exists, if there exists a   such 
that  
), 0 , H ( q q i
'
i <




i i > −
  Proof, see appendix 2. 
 
The necessary condition says that it must be less costly for the high cost type 
than for the low cost type to decrease reductions below   defined by the 
condition in result 1. In this way it resembles a sorting condition well-known 
form the signalling literature. Figure 3 explains this condition. Typically, the set 
of separating equilibrium outcomes is large, and this shortcoming will be dealt 
with now by introducing equilibrium refinements.  
) 0 , (H qi
 





















Equilibrium refinements used for signalling games are based on the notion of 
forward induction, which asserts that when rational players enter a game, they 
should, in evaluating strategies, reason from the beginning of the game-tree by 
using introspection, i.e., by examining who has an incentive to send possible 
out-of-equilibrium messages, and then revise beliefs accordingly. Given that it 
is common knowledge among the players that everyone engages in this intro-
spection process, an implicit communication emerges. To see how refinements 
based on this idea work, imagine that a player picks a candidate equilibrium outcome and then reviews the beliefs about out-of-equilibrium information sets 
that sustain this outcome. The player then applies a refinement criterion that de-
scribes what constitutes a reasonable belief. If, by taking into account the rea-
sonableness of these beliefs and believing that the other players do so too, at 
least one player has an incentive to deviate, then this outcome is no longer an 
equilibrium in the refined game. 
 
The requirement for belief formation applied in this paper says that it should be 
common knowledge among rational players that they never play a strategy pro-
file that a particular player has no incentive to play. We say that a strategy q’ is 
weakly dominated by another strategy q’’ for type θ, if, no matter what beliefs 
the uninformed player could possibly hold after observing the move of the in-
formed player, the expected payoff of playing q’’ always exceeds the expected 
maximum payoff of playing q’ for the informed player. 
 
Definition:   Weakly dominated (WD) strategy: A strategy q’ is WD by q’’ for 
type θ, if  ) 0 , ' , ( ) 1 , ' ' , ( ) , ' , ( max ) , ' ' , ( min q P q P q NB q NB i i i i θ θ ρ θ ρ θ ρ ρ ≥ ⇒ ≥ . 
 
The definition says that even in the case where q’’ is followed by the worst pos-
sible circumstances from the point of view of the informed player, this reduc-
tion level is still preferred to q’, even when q’ is followed by the best possible 
circumstances, then q’ is weakly dominated for this type. We want to apply this 
requirement to reduce the set of separating equilibria, by invoking the following 
requirement.  
 
Requirement on belief formation: If a signal q’ is weakly dominated for one 
type θ, but not for the other type, then the uninformed players’ belief should 
place zero probability that θ has sent q’, i.e. q’ must be followed by posterior 
ρ(θ|q’)=0. 
 
Applying this relatively non-controversial requirement has tremendous cutting 
power on the set of separating equilibria, as stated now: 
 
21Result 2:  There exist only one undominated separating sequential equilib-








Result 2 is intuitive, since the H-type uses costly actions in order to try to sepa-
rate from the shadow of the L-type. A rational player chooses this particular 
strategy, which implies the minimum necessary costs in order to separate, and, 
hence, the Pareto-optimal separating equilibrium is obtained implying the 
minimum possible distortion from the full information (first best) allocation. 
 
Compared to Hoel (1991), unilateral actions are fully explained as a rational 
move to reveal that costs are high. However, from (2) and (3) it follows that al-
though revelation of costs can increase the response of the other country, in this 
model it cannot be the case that, un-coordinated, both increase their reductions. 
Moreover, compared to what should be required for an action to serve as a 
‘good example’, the action is in the wrong direction, since in our model, the 
high cost country reduces less in order to trigger an increase in the other coun-
tries’ reduction. Most importantly, however, the unilateral actions do not ‘set a 
good example’ and do not establish any move forward solving the underlying 
environmental problem.  
 
Proposition 1:  In Hoel’s (1991) model, simply adding private information 
about costs and allowing unilateral actions to reveal such costs 
does not result in ‘setting a good example’. 
 
Hence, the information structure of signalling game 1 does not yield a better 
prospect for unilateral actions than does the original analysis of Hoel (1991). 
The reason why the other countries reduce more in the non-cooperative setting 
is that country i reduces less, due to it having high costs, and hence, it strategi-
cally exploits information. In this respect this looks more like an act of free rid-
ing. The signalling game model 1 however shows what is needed in order for a 
unilateral move to ‘set a good example’. 
 
225.  Information structure and correlation of costs 
Consider the following information structure. Initially, the countries are at q
nc. 
No country wants to initiate further reductions. Costs of further reductions are 
uncertain, with probability ρ, θ=L and with probability (1-ρ), θ=H, but most 
importantly, costs are fully correlated between countries. This information 
structure is common knowledge to the countries. Next, a country undertakes an 
assessment of the costs of reductions and it is assumed that it gets fully, but pri-
vately, informed. If it is revealed that costs are low, the country will initiate 
full-scale unilateral actions, if those actions indisputably reveal that costs are 
low. If it is revealed that costs are high, no further reductions will be made if all 
other countries believe that costs are high (but it will make unilateral actions, if 
it could convince the other countries that costs are low). Given this information 
structure, it is possible to state conditions where unilateral actions are indeed 
profitable.  
 
Formally, the following 4 assumptions are made regarding the information 
structure:  
 
Assumption A1 (correlation of costs): The cost-parameter is fully correlated 
between countries, i.e.  I j i j i ∈ ∀ = , , θ θ . 
 
Assumption A2 (assessment of costs): Any country i can get fully (but pri-
vately) informed about θi. The cost of doing so, is Di > 0. 
 
Assumption A3 (profitability of unilateral actions for one country):  
a) Let   for all  ) ( ) (
2 1 ρ ρ q q = ρ ρ <
1  and  ρ ρ <
2  and let  ρ ρ <
o . 
b) Let  i i i i i i i D )) L ( q ), L ( q , L ( NB )) ( q ), ( q , ( NB : I i + ≤ ∈ ∃ − − ρ ρ ρ  and  
j j j j j j j D L q L q L NB q q NB i j + ≤ ≠ ∀ − − )) ( ), ( , ( )) ( ), ( , ( : ρ ρ ρ . 
 
Assumption A4 (Information-transmission): No verification technologies exist. 
 
 
23The first assumption (A1) requires that the underlying cost parameter is fully 
positively correlated between countries. Does there exist international environ-
mental problems where the costs of reductions are positively correlated between 
countries? This could be the case in situations, where, if a country takes unilat-
eral actions, it has to implement measures that hereafter are also available to 
other countries. Examples of this are measures to reduce current CO2 emissions. 
If the establishment of windmills and their integration into the conventional en-
ergy-system can be shown to be cheap, it will be cheap for every country that 
can use wind for energy production. If the switching from coal fired to natural 
gas fired power plants is revealed to be cheap, this can be used for any country 
that uses coal as it’s fuel-input. The most classical example, which shows a case 
with positively correlated costs, and how their revelation enables further reduc-
tions, can be found in the efforts to control substances that deplete the ozone 
layer. In 1987, a breakdown in the negotiations over the Montreal Protocol 
seemed inevitable, but following the rapid development of acceptable (i.e., 
cheap) substitutes (in the US) producers had much to gain from a CFC-ban. 
Producers had no incentives to put up any political opposition to the Montreal 
protocol, and a breakthrough in the negotiations occurred.
11  
 
Although costs are not likely to fully positively correlated, for now, this is as-
sumed, but the analysis could be thought of as being used to answer the follow-
ing question: How does correlation of costs influence the likelihood of profit-
able unilateral actions? In section 7, it is analysed how changes in the correla-
tion affects the likelihood of unilateral actions. 
 
Assumption A2 says that a country become get fully informed about costs, 
without undertaking the actual reductions: To make our analysis tractable, it is 
simply (but somewhat unrealistically) assumed that it can be fully informed. 
We assume that the country incurs a fixed (sunk) cost of being informed. This 
could range all the way from detailed reports to the establishment of non-
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11   Sandler, 1997, page 113.  polluting energy-supply system.
12 Again, we will analyse the effects of this as-
sumption in section 7. 
 
Assumption A3a means that at the current state of information, that for all 
ρ ρ < , the reduction levels will remain unchanged. This assumption is needed 
in order for unilateral actions ever to be profitable, and can be justified by the 
fact that costs of reductions refers to further reductions. We offer a more con-
vincing explanation in section 7. Given this assumption, A3b says that one and 
only one country has an incentive to gather information. One way of thinking of 
this is that at a given date, no country has such an incentive, but as time passes, 
cost and damage figures change, or the cost of becoming informed changes. 
(E.g. new scientific information reveals that damage costs are higher than ex-
pected.) All in all, the effect of this is assumed to be that at some date it is 
worthwhile for one country to become informed. In section 7 we offer an alter-
native explanation of how to identify the country that undertakes the unilateral 
actions. 
 
Assumption A4 is probably the most critical assumption. The assumption 
means that although a country becomes fully informed about the common cost 
parameter, it cannot costlessly verify this information to the other countries. 
This can be justified by pointing out that, even if the country observes that costs 
are high, it has an incentive (now more than ever) to persuade the uninformed 
countries that costs are low, by misstating data, or any possible way of misin-
forming. This assumption is needed in order for a country to distinguish itself 
from the shadow of a high cost country by use of a costly signal (the full scale 
unilateral actions) that would never be profitable if it had high costs. We also 
offer an alternative set-up that, from a public choice point of view, gives a more 
detailed description of the mechanisms by which information is transmitted be-
tween countries.  
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12   A more realistic approach is shown in Kessler (1998), where the more a country invests in the 
information gathering activity (which increases costs), the higher is the probability to become 
informed.  With these assumptions in place, we turn to the description of the signalling 
game that forms the basis for the unilateral actions, since we then assume that 
updates are dependent on observed levels of reductions only. 
6.  The signalling game 2: Incentives to signal that 
costs are low 
The timing of events in the correlated model is as follows: Nature draws a 
(common) type θ  from the set {L, H}, according to a probability distribution 
(ρ, 1-ρ) where ρ=prob (θ=L). One country, denoted country i, makes an effort 
to reveal θ. Given this, this country is totally informed, whereas the other coun-
tries remain uninformed. Hereafter, this country chooses a reduction level 
qi∈Qi. The other countries  , observe q i j ≠ j, but not θ, and choose their reduc-
tion level qj∈Qj. The net benefit functions are still  ) q , q , ( NB NB j i i i θ = , but now 
the type of the uninformed countries are determined by their posterior belief, 
hence  )) q ( , q ), q ( ( NB NB i i i j j q ( q , j i ρ ρ = . Note that compared to the non-
correlated situation, it is now the low cost country that needs to undertake 
costly efforts in order to separate. 
 
Under what conditions can a low cost country reveal its true costs and get the 
uninformed to increase their reductions accordingly? First of all, a collection of 
reduction levels and beliefs { )} ( ˆ , ˆ , ˆ i L H q q q ρ  forms a sequential equilibrium if 
the following conditions are satisfied:  
 
i) Optimality for the country with costs θ: 
)) q ( , q ( q , q , ( NB max arg q ˆ i i j i i ρ θ θ ∈  
 
ii) Beliefs are Bayes-consistent: 
a)    1 ) q ˆ ( ˆ   and   0 ) q ˆ ( ˆ   then   q ˆ q ˆ   If L H L H = = ≠ ρ ρ
b)   
o
L H L H ) q ˆ ( ˆ ) q ˆ ( ˆ   then    q ˆ q ˆ   If ρ ρ ρ = = =
 
26c)  0 ) q (   then   } q ˆ , q ˆ { q   If L H = ≠ θ θ ρ  
 
Regarding the beliefs again let any out-of-equilibrium moves be followed by 
the worst possible beliefs from the point of view of the informed country. This 
now means that  0 ) ( ˆ     ˆ q = ≠ θ θ ρ q then qL . If costs turn out to be low, the informed 
country will try to convince the uninformed that costs are low. It can do so by 
unilaterally increasing its reductions to such an extent that only a low cost 
country could profit from such a move, even if beliefs are updated most favora-
bly from the point of view of the informed country. If costs turn out to be low, 
the following two conditions are necessary for the low cost country to separate. 
 
) 0 ), 1 , L ( q , L ( NB ) 1 , q , L ( NB i
UA
i i ≥  (6.a) 
) 0 ), 0 , ( , (   ) 1 , , ( H q H NB q H NB i
UA
i i ≤  (6.b) 
 
In order to describe the set of separating equilibrium outcomes, it is convenient 
to define the following two sets: 
 






i ≥ ∈ =






i ≤ ∈ = } )   
 
The intersection of these two sets is given by  . In or-
der for the low cost type to accomplish this, assume the following single cross-
ing condition (SCC): For all   and all  : 
. The SCC says that 
an increase in beliefs (beliefs that costs are higher), increases the NB more for a 
low cost country than for a high cost country.  
} R R q | q { R
H L
i i
SC ∩ ∈ =
' ρ >
1 q , q













i i ρ ρ ρ > −
 
The set of separating equilibrium outcomes is given by  
 
SC L
i R q ˆ ∈  (7.a) 
 
27) 0 , H ( q q ˆ
H
i =  (7.b) 
 
And will, under the given assumptions, always exist:  
 
Result 3:  Given the single crossing condition, there always exists a separating 
equilibrium given by (7.a) and (7.b).  Proof, see appendix 2. 
 
This result is reproduced in figure 4, where   and  are indicated by the dot-
ted lines as defines above. The interception indicated by the bold line indicates 
the set of separating equilibrium outcomes, all representing an increase in re-






Again, as in section 3, the requirement on belief formation will be that if a sig-
nal q’ is weakly dominated for one type θ, but not for the other type, the unin-
formed players’ belief should place zero probability that θ has sent q’, i.e. q’ 
must be followed by posterior ρ(θ|q’)=0. The result of doing this is stated be-
low: 
 
Result 4:  There exists one undominated separating equilibrium, 
, where 
. 







| arg{ sup NB Q q q i i
UA
i ∈ = } ) 0 ), 1 , ( , ( ) 1 , , ( L q L NB q L i i i =
   Proof, see appendix 2 
 
 
28Figure 4.   The set of separating equilibrium outcomes  
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The main findings of this section the following proposition summarizes: 
 
Proposition 2:  Given A1-A4 and the SCC, when costs are fully correlated, but 
no country initially is informed about the true cost level, and a 
country can be fully informed, then  ,  , 
and the response by the uninformed countries are also to in-
creased reductions. 
) 1 , (L q q
UA




Hence, the reduction of each country is higher and in this case unilateral action 
clearly has a potential to move the countries’ reduction levels in the right direc-
tion (seen both from an environmental and an economic point of view), com-
pared to the result in Hoel (1991). Note that the reason for unilateral action is 
the inability of a low cost country to verify its costs unless it engages in costly 
activity that convinces the other countries about its true type. Hence, unilateral 
actions are a consequence of an adverse selection problem and the incentives 
(for a high cost type) to misrepresent the true costs. Note that given assumption 
A3a and A3b, it is also profitable for a country to undertake unilateral actions, 
 
29and given A4, it is optimal to take unilateral actions, since there exists no other 
means of transmitting information than by the appropriate choice of qi. 
7. Relaxing  the  assumptions 
The result stated in proposition 1 builds on a number of strong assumptions. 
This section is devoted to analyzing how the assumptions influence the prob-
ability of unilateral actions. First and foremost, it is interesting to investigate the 
role of the correlation of costs for the result in proposition 2. Let γ be the corre-
lation, i.e. γ=1 means fully positive correlation. Common sense suggests that 
the higher the correlation, the more likely are unilateral actions. The analysis of 
this paper verifies this intuition. 
 
Result 5:  Given A2-A4, there exists a  0 > γ  such that for all  γ γ > , unilateral 
actions are profitable if costs are low, and for  γ γ ≤ , unilateral ac-
tions are not profitable.  Proof, see Appendix 2. 
 
First, it is important to recognize that unilateral actions are more likely to be 
profitable the more a given increase in beliefs increases the response in terms of 
increased reductions. The reason for this is that a country will only engage in 
unilateral actions if the expected gain of doing so outweighs the costs of be-
coming informed. Note, however, that this is not an obvious conclusion. Both 
types prefer a high response and since unilateral actions are used by the low 
cost country to separate from the shadow of the high cost type, a higher re-
sponse only makes unilateral actions more likely (i.e. separation more likely) 
when the low cost type profits more from a better response than does the high 
cost country. But this is exactly what the single crossing condition implies: The 
low cost country will need less costly effort to separate. Now it is easy to verify 
that the assumption of high correlation is important. If the informed country’s 
signal is only an imperfect signal (imperfectly correlated costs), then the updat-
ing of beliefs will never reach 1. Hence, more reduction efforts are needed to 
get a response at all, and once the response appears, it is to a less extent. The 
 
30higher the correlation, the more an increase in beliefs about the informed coun-
try will change expectations about own cost: The higher the correlation, the 
higher the response, and the more likely the unilateral move implying that the 
level of unilateral actions will be smaller in separating equilibria. 
 
Regarding A2: If a country can only receive an imperfect signal about the costs, 
this reduces the profitability of unilateral actions, since the expected benefit of 
making the initial assessment decreases. The reason is that since there is now a 
risk that a country will mistakenly take unilateral actions although costs turn out 
to be high, it is more costly to initiate unilateral actions.  
The curse of the initial mover  
Result 6:  The more likely that unilateral actions will be initiate, 
  a)  The lower the estimated costs of getting informed,  
  b)  The larger the expected response,  
  c)  The higher the expected correlation.  
 
Assumption A3 is needed in order for one country to undertake unilateral ac-
tions. Instead of letting Di vary between countries, we could have that a country 
considering engaging in unilateral actions must form expectations about what 
the response of other countries will be. Assuming that countries hold different 
assessments about the reactions of the others, we get the following result: 
 
Why do different countries hold different beliefs? Could it be that countries 
with high international environmental profiles believe that if they reveal that 
costs are not as high as expected, other countries will be convinced of the ne-
cessity to make larger reductions in emissions.
13 If so, then countries with 
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13   This hypothesis is based more on empirical evidence than on a theoretical foundation. The em-
pirical evidence supporting it is best summarized by this quote from Rabin (1998, page 26): ‘A 
range of research suggests that once forming strong hypotheses, people are often too inattentive 
to new information contradicting their hypotheses. The form of anchoring does not necessarily 
imply that people misinterpret additional evidence, only that they ignore additional evidence. strong international environmental profiles will take unilateral actions, while 
countries with low such profiles will tend to make their strategies contingent on 
the actual achievements of other countries. This could also be supported by the 
presence of self-serving beliefs.
14 Taken together it says that countries that 
value environmental protection highly also tend to believe that other countries 
do. Hence, the country most likely to engage in unilateral action is the one that 
has the most positive perception (expectation) about the response in terms of 
increased reductions aboard. But this will have serious consequences for the 
country undertaking the unilateral actions. Since it has the highest estimate, the 
real size of the response is likely to be smaller, and, ex post, the unilateral ac-
tions will probably not be (as) profitable. This resembles the well-known phe-
nomenon called the winner’s curse from auction theory. This we restate as re-
sult 7. 
 
Result 7:  The curse of the country that initiates the unilateral action: Since the 
country with the highest estimate of the others’ response will initi-
ate the unilateral action, this country is likely to over-estimate the 
actual response. 
 
Hence, in the end, the country undertaking the unilateral actions will be disap-
pointed, and should consider updating its beliefs about the responses. 
Alternative specification of the information structure 
By changing the information structure, we have identified conditions where 
unilateral actions are profitable in the framework of Hoel (1991). We now offer 
an alternative specification of how information can be transmitted to other 
countries by use of a very simple public choice model. There are several rea-
sons why we do this. One is that this removes the necessity of assumption A4 
and yields a more convincing argument for assumption A3b. It moreover gives 
                                                           
Psychological evidence reveals a stronger and more provocative phenomenon: people tend to 
misread evidence as additional support for initial hypotheses. 
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14   For a discussion of such beliefs, see Dahl and Ransom (1999). a more satisfactory explanation for how “setting a good example” could be ac-
complished, why costs are correlated and how revelation of costs in one country 
changes incentives in other countries.  
 
The alternative way of modelling the spillover effect on the level of environ-
mental regulation in other countries is by taking into consideration the political 
process in the countries. An example will be presented below, building on a 
simple influential function approach inspired by Becker (1983).
15 We assume 
that the decision about the level of environmental regulation in a country is de-
termined by the lobbing activities of two pressure groups: An industrial group 
(IG) lobbying for no reductions and an environmental group (EG) lobbying for 
high reductions.
16 The more pressure a group exerts, the more it influences the 
policy outcome. According to Svendsen (1998), the EG try to maximize their 
influence through maximizing membership. Increasing membership increases 
payments and, hence, enables these groups to increase their lobbing activities. 
One way of increasing membership is to convince potential members of the im-
portance of a strong EG. By pointing to achievements in other countries and 
arguing that these results are a consequence of strong EGs the domestic EG has 
a strong argument that results in higher pressure on the decision-makers. On the 
other hand, an IG uses issues such as losses of international competitiveness 
and, consequent increases in unemployment and reductions in export as argu-
ments against environmental regulation. The higher are the reduction costs, and 
the more severe the problems related to the IGs, the more weight will the IG’s 
arguments receive in the decision.  
 
In order to integrate this public choice model into the signalling model, we must 
still require that qi is the outcome of a maximizing process. This requires a re-
interpretation of the cost and benefit functions associated with reducing emis-
                                                           
15   See also Potters and Sloof (1996) for a survey of this type of model. 
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16   That lobbyism influences the decisions of policy-makers is well documented. Svendsen (1998) 
mentions that all eight existing US permit marked programs have been distorted politically 
through lobby activities. Haas, Keohane and Levy (1993) note that if there is one key variable 
accounting for policy change, it is the degree of domestic environmentalist pressure in major 
industrialized democracies, and not the decision making rules of the relevant institution. sions in expression [1]. One proposal is as follows: define a country’s wealth 
(utility) connected with the emission as  . Wealth 
in country i is given by  . Given this specification, define now 
. Given the discussion above, we have that  
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. The higher the costs, the more the IG suffers if it 
has to make reductions, and the more this group is willing to lobby against re-
duction (the marginal gain from lobbying is increasing in c). On the other hand, 
the EG is suffering from global emissions, but the level of costs has no effect on 
the utility of the EG.
17  
 
In this way qi is chosen as the welfare maximizing choice of country i (as a 
trade-off between conflicting preferences of two influential interest groups, and 
in optimum balancing the benefit to the EG of the reductions with the costs of 
doing so for the IG). 
 
In all countries, where the political decision process is as described above, the 
industry has incentives to try to make policy makes believe that costs are high. 
Compared to the model in section 5, this better explains the assumption about 
the high correlation of costs. Since the correlation is related to the political sys-
tems in a country. Given identical political systems, the incentives to believe 
that costs are high are also identical. It, moreover, also better explains how the 
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17   Other specifications could be used, but what is important is how the cost estimates influence a 




This model can also be used to motivate why countries initially do not reduce 
(or reduce as if costs of further reductions are high). Assume that for 
] , 0 [
o ρ ρ ∈  a country will not engage in any reduction efforts. A reason for this 
could be that as long as costs are believed to be high with a high probability, 
then the IG will have almost full discretion over national policy (the marginal 
gain from pressure from the IG is relatively high). Consequently, the IG will 
put sufficiently high pressure against national reductions such that this country 
acts as a high cost country.
19 Importantly, though, as long as the government 
has no incentives to become informed, which is the case as long as its estimates 
of others’ responses are not sufficiently high, we know from section that the 
decision makers have good incentives to accept claims (e.g. from home indus-
try) that costs are high. When a government has a pretty clear picture of the 
costs, then it needs an extremely high effort from the IG to change this picture. 
The chain of arguments goes as follows: Initially, the country holds a prior be-
lief about its own costs and others’ costs and the pressure from the IG to make 
no reductions is relatively effective, since 
o ρ ρ < . Now, the other country 
makes a cost revealing move and costs are low. The higher the correlation of 
costs, the more ‘informed’ the government becomes, and the less is the mar-
ginal effect of the pressure from the IG, in which case the pressure is reduced 
and the national reduction is increased. 
 
Finally, let us combine all the insights gained in this paper. Simply letting uni-
lateral actions be motivated by revelation of costs is not enough to get a satis-
factory explanation of unilateral actions. If reduction costs are correlated then 
the transmission of information by use of a unilateral move makes sense. The 
prospects of unilateral actions are enhanced if we re-model the determination of 
policy choices. When such choices are made on the basis of messages received 
                                                           
18   This could, e.g., be the case for western democracies. 
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19   An example is the US policy on climate change issues, where the relatively high probability of 
high costs has been given as the main reason against any reduction effort. from influential IGs, then unilateral actions by one country can change the ef-
fect of such messages. However, unilateral actions have not always been as 
successful as expected. One explanation offered in this paper is that the initiator 
of unilateral actions is the country with the highest expectation about its pros-
pects of influencing other countries’ decision processes. Since the country hold-
ing the highest expectation is likely to overestimate the true state, it is likely to 
be disappointed. In conclusion, this paper both provides positive and negative 
prospects for the initiator of unilateral actions as movements towards an effec-




The analysis presented in this paper builds on the crucial assumption that uni-
lateral actions concern the revelation of information about the cost side. Is it 
reasonable to expect that uncertainty relates to the cost side and not the damage 
side? We believe that taking unilateral actions reveals the true costs. Once rele-
vant measures are implemented, information regarding their efficiency and their 
costs are available. On the other hand, a unilateral action will not reveal the 
damage costs (or equally, the benefits from reductions). In particular, if consid-
ering a global pollution problem, the effect of one country on the total stock of 
pollution will probably be negligible, and no new information regarding the 
damage cost functions is revealed. Moreover, compared to the model in section 
5, taking into account the public choice model, unilateral actions as a cost re-
vealing mechanism becomes even more likely: If we look at the problems of 
implementing the Kyoto-agreement, the US policymakers repeatedly claimed 
that the costs of reductions were simply too high to justify the efforts can. Such 
a statement can only be undermined if it is revealed that also for US costs of 
reductions are low. We also believe that signalling as a mechanism of informa-
tion transmission in the way described in this paper is not unreasonable. The 
reason is that countries are only convinced by hard facts (and not by a report 
from a government hired consultancy agency), simply because incentives are 
such that each country has an incentive to try to convince others that costs are 
low. However, only when a country has verified that costs are low by imple-menting the necessary measures, that is, by engaging in full-scale unilateral ac-
tions, can it possibly convince the other countries. But why is this an efficient 
means of transmission. 
 
Another reason to undertake unilateral actions is the expectation of achieving a 
first mover advantage. The existence of such advantages clearly enhances the 
prospect of unilateral actions. In particular, the way unilateral actions are mod-
elled in this paper, where it is assumed that a country actually undertaking the 
necessary reduction measures, this country clearly has a first mover advantage. 
In this case a country could reveal that costs are low, trigger higher reductions 
in other countries and at the same time increase the potential of the first mover 
advantages by enabling large-scale export possibilities. A country that engages 
in unilateral actions could also make its move more profitable by engaging in 
activities that yield first mover advantages. For example, in Denmark national 
subsidies of the windmill industry could turn out to be extremely profitable if a 
significant reduction of CO2 emissions is initiated globally. 
 
It has been argued that the emergence of substitute substances for CFC gasses 
changed certain EU countries’ strategies in the run-up to the Montreal protocol, 
from being reluctant participants to taking the lead. If we include first mover 
advantages, the conclusion about the curse of the initiator of unilateral actions 
might no longer be valid. The reason is that if first mover advantages vary (or 
are highly distinct) for the countries, then even if a country does not have high 
expectations (compared to some average for the countries) it might still initiate 
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Comparative static. Suppose that a is some parameter that shifts the net benefit 
function of country 1. The Nash equilibrium is described by the conditions: 
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40Assume that the denominator is positive (due to uniqueness and slope, see Var-
ian (1992) p 288-289). 
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Assume that the denominator is positive (due to uniqueness and slope, see Var-
ian (1992) p 288-289). 
 





























































Changes in country 1’s costs, i.e. let a=c1. 
 

















































The intuition is that when country 1’s costs increases, this leads to smaller re-
ductions by country 1, smaller reductions increase the marginal benefit for 
country 2 of the same level of reductions, and, hence, it will reduce more in re-
sponse. 
Appendix 2 
Proof of result 1: We will show that a   exists that satisfies both 4.a 
and 4.b. Define  , i.e.   is the smallest 
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i satisfying 4.b. If at the same time,   satisfies 4.a with strict inequality, then 
existence is guaranteed. Given that  , then also 
, since q(H,0) is the unique maximizer of 
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From this we have that 
. Hence, in order 
to get separation, there must exist a   such that 
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Proof of result 2: Weak domination for the low cost type in this set-up corre-
sponds to the following inequality. If  , then all   
are weakly dominated by q(L,1). But this expression is equal to 3.2, the condi-
tion satisfied by all separating equilibria. Hence, all   are weakly dominated by 
q(L,1) for the low cost type.  
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Proof of result 3: Define  . If there 
exists a   satisfying 6.a with strict inequality, then existence is guaranteed. If 
, then also  , since 
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equilibrium exists. But this is guaranteed via the single crossing condition.  
 
Proof of result 4: 
Weak domination of q  for the high cost type in this case corresponds to the 
following inequality:  
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i q q ˆ , posterior beliefs will be updated to  , 
and consequently, given this new set of beliefs, only 















Proof of result 5: First we note that if γ=0, then UA is not relevant (result 1 and 
2) in the sense that a unilateral increase in reductions by one country will not 
increase reductions abroad. On the other hand, given proposition 2, given γ=1, 
UA is profitable. From (4) we have that  0
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, which says that 
the higher the correlation, the more the other countries will increase their reduc-
tions (i.e. the larger will be  ). Next, due to the SCP,  ) ( j
UA
j j q q q − . 
Hence, increased γ implies less UA is needed to get a higher response, and 
hence,  0
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